WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) and Adam Klein, Director of the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin, authored the following op-ed in the Wall Street Journal underscoring the national security imperative of FISA Section 702 and urging Congress to reauthorize this vital tool during the lame-duck session before it goes completely dark, which would jeopardize the safety of the American people as the United States faces an increasingly dangerous threat landscape:

A Vital National Security Tool Shouldn’t Go Dark

Senator John Cornyn and Adam Klein

The Wall Street Journal

November 11, 2026
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/a-vital-national-security-tool-shouldnt-go-dark-8158534a

The U.S. is in its most dangerous era since the end of the Cold War. We face military and economic conflict with Iran, tensions with China, cyber threats and increasingly sophisticated foreign terrorist organizations working to kill Americans and bring drugs into our country. As drones and artificial intelligence transform the threat landscape, we can’t deprive our leaders or American troops abroad of vital intelligence.

Against this backdrop, Congress needs to act on a crucial intelligence authority that has expired and may soon go dark. Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which CIA Director John Ratcliffe has called “an indispensable national-security tool,” lapsed in June. While parts of the authority remain in place to prevent catastrophe, Congress can’t put off the issue.

To understand why Section 702 matters, consider that on the internet, data crosses borders almost instantaneously. Because American companies still dominate online infrastructure, foreign communications often travel over networks based here. That gives the U.S. an advantage. When messages involving foreign intelligence targets cross American networks, our agencies can collect that information in real time and use it to thwart those who seek to do us harm. The underlying legal authority for that is Section 702.

Section 702 may be our most valuable intelligence authority in a post-9/11 world. U.S. intelligence agencies estimated that 60% of the articles in the President’s Daily Brief, a collection of the most vital classified intelligence, came from 702. Section 702 has helped stop foreign terrorist plots against our homeland, international drug trafficking, and foreign cyberattacks against our infrastructure.

Last year Mr. Ratcliffe testified that 90% of his agency’s success in interdicting synthetic drugs was the result of information acquired pursuant to Section 702. FBI Director Kash Patel warned last month that “were that to go dark, we would have a lot of problems.”

The authority is powerful, but narrow. Section 702 can be used only to target foreigners abroad who have information on specific foreign-intelligence topics: foreign governments, counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international narcotics trafficking. It can never be used to target U.S. citizens or people in the U.S.

That doesn’t mean Americans are never affected. The most debated aspect of Section 702 is “U.S.-person queries,” in which analysts—in limited circumstances—can use an American’s name or other identifying details to retrieve data incidentally but lawfully collected under Section 702. This can be useful in terrorism or counterintelligence investigations when investigators have a factual basis to believe an American may be working for a foreign terrorist group or spy service, or that an American is a potential victim of foreign terrorism or espionage.

All the same, these queries raise important questions for civil liberties. In the past, some FBI agents ran queries that didn’t comply with program rules. Most of the errors stemmed from misunderstanding the rules, not malice, but any noncompliance is unacceptable when Americans’ personal data is involved.

To address those concerns, Congress enacted dozens of reforms when it renewed Section 702 in 2024. Many related to U.S.-person queries, including requirements for a prior written justification, supervisory approvals, and audits.

These reforms are working. In recent congressional testimony, Mr. Patel said that the FBI’s compliance with the query rules had risen from 82% in 2020 to more than 99% in 2025. The number of searches involving U.S. persons by FBI agents has also fallen dramatically.

What worries us is the legislative calendar. The existing court orders extend to next spring, but waiting until then to reauthorize 702 is risky. The current lame-duck session may be Congress’s last and best chance to reauthorize Section 702. Renewal this year would ensure that intelligence officials have time to seek new court orders before the current ones expire.

Leaders of the Senate Judiciary and Intelligence committees have proposed renewing 702 coupled with a strong set of reforms. Their draft enjoys bipartisan support and has a good chance of passing both houses of Congress.

With a handful of legislative days scheduled before Thanksgiving and only a few weeks left in this year’s session, Congress must make a priority of Section 702. Letting it lapse would strip vital intelligence from the commander in chief and our troops abroad and put the American people more at risk in a dangerous world.